·     Appellant’s violation of DRMC §2-67, use of public office for private gain, constitutes violation of this rule as well.  In re Abdi,CSA 63-07, 29 (2/19/08).

·      Appellant violated rule where she used her position to help her sister’s fraudulent application for public assistance.  In re Abdi, CSA 63-07, 29 (2/19/08).

·      Deputy sheriff who asked police for “professional courtesy” when arrested for failing to pay for a beer while off duty failed to conduct himself in a manner reflecting credit on the city in violation of rule.  In re Mergl, CSA 131-05, 6 (3/13/06) (decided under former § 15-20).

·      Harassment and discrimination based on age and political affiliation are proper subjects for appeal.  In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 4 (1/5/05).

·      Political affiliation discrimination complaint failed when appellant, an unsuccessful applicant for promotion, failed to show that the agency knew of successful applicant’s political support of mayor, and therefore failed to establish nexus between applicant’s eventual layoff and his political affiliation.  In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 7 (1/5/05).

15-82:  Prohibited communications

·       Appellant’s knowing retrieval of obscene photographs as a result of his internet search on a city computer was a violation of § 15-82, and did not comport with the permissible occasional use of city computers for personal purposes pursuant to § 15-83.  In re Strasser, CSA 44-07, 4 (10/16/07).

15-83:  Personal use

·      Appellant’s knowing retrieval of obscene photographs as a result of his internet search on a city computer was a violation of § 15-82, and did not comport with the permissible occasional use of city computers for personal purposes pursuant to § 15-83.  In re Strasser, CSA 44-07, 4 (10/16/07).

15-96:  Representing employees during work hours

·      The word “representative” for purposes of this rule does not include a pro se appellant.  In re Herzog, CSA 51-05 (Order 7/5/05).   

                Adverse action

·      Testimony that agency favored another candidate for a promotion is not an adverse action where both appellant and the other candidate were African American, and appellant was selected for the promotion.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 5 (6/13/05).

·      Statement that appellant was expected to continue performing higher level duties after demotion in lieu of layoff was not an adverse action where agency relieved appellant of those duties at her request.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).

·      Agency’s reassignment of her former higher-level duties to a Caucasian coworker was not an adverse action where appellant requested that reassignment.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).

Discrimination

In general

·      The requirements for establishing an employment discrimination case are 1) the employee belongs to a protected class, 2) the employee was qualified for the job at issue, 3) despite his qualifications, the employee suffered an adverse employment decision, e.g., a demotion, discharge or failure to promote, and 4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9 (5/3/06), citing In re Cobb, CSA 163-03 (2/5/04).

·      Intentional discrimination is proven by evidence of 1) membership in a protected class,

        2) an adverse employment action, and 3) evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.  In re Johnson, CSA 135-05, 3 (3/10/06), citing In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 5 (6/13/05); O’Connor v Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).

·      Appellant is a member of a protected class based on her sex.  In re Johnson, CSA 135

        05, 3 (3/10/06).

·      Discrimination made unlawful by federal, state or local law or regulation is likewise prohibited by the City and County of Denver.  In re Johnson, CSA 135-05, 3 (3/10/06).

·      Tangible employment action under Title VII is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different duties, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. In re Johnson, CSA 135-05, 3-4 (3/10/06), citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).

·      Appellant may prove discipline is pretext for discrimination by showing that he was treated differently than other similarly-situated, non-protected employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness.  In re Trujillo, CSA 44-05, 5 (11/14/05).

·      An employee is similarly situated to appellant if they have the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance and discipline.  The hearing officer should also compare the relevant employment circumstances, such as work history and company policies to determine whether they are similarly situated.  In re Trujillo, CSA 44-05, 5 (11/14/05), citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).

·      Agency may be found to discriminate if agency head acted as a rubber stamp, or “cat’s paw”, for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if agency head lacked discriminatory intent.   In re Trujillo, CSA 44-05, 5 (11/14/05), citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).

·      Appellant has the burden to establish the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination. In re Roberts, CSA 179-04, 5 (6/29/05), citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

·      Intentional discrimination requires proof of 1) membership in a protected class, 2) an adverse employment action, and 3) evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, such as disparate treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected group.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 5 (6/13/05).

·      To establish disparate treatment, it is necessary to show that the employees whose treatment is being compared to appellant’s are similarly situated in all relevant respects.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6-7 (6/13/05), citing Ward v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Co., 111 F. 3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1997).

·      Disparate impact discrimination is proven if employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05), citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977).

·      In disparate impact discrimination, it is necessary to show that the employees whose treatment is being compared are similarly situated in all relevant respects.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6-7 (6/13/05), citing  Ward v. Proctor & Gamble Products Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1997). 

·      Disparate discipline claim must compare only similarly situated employees. They must have reported to the same supervisor, must have been subject to the same performance and discipline standards, and must have engaged in conduct similar to that of appellant, without other circumstances that would distinguish the misconduct or the appropriate discipline for it. In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 10 (3/31/05), citing Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 642 F.Supp. 1531, 1546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

·      Discriminatory intent may be proven circumstantially by evidence that the agency treated employees outside the protected class more favorably under similar circumstances.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 9 (3/31/05), citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Smith v. City of Jackson, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2931. 

·      Harassment and discrimination based on age and political affiliation are proper subjects for appeal. In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 4 (1/5/05).

Discrimination not found

·      Hispanic male disciplined for a different offense, excessive absenteeism, was not similarly situated to appellant, who was disciplined for addressing coworkers with terms of endearment after being instructed to stop.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9 (5/3/06), citing Mensah-Sowah v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 24967 (10^th Cir. 1996). 

·      Other employee who used terms of endearment was not similarly situated to appellant where there was no proof of his national origin or supervisor, or whether he had been instructed to stop or disciplined for that behavior.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9 (5/3/06), citing Mensah-Sowah v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 24967 (10^th Cir. 1996).

·      Agency presented valid business reason to discipline employee based on his failure to heed prior discipline for addressing coworkers with unwelcome terms of endearment.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9 (5/3/06).

·      Evidence that prior supervisor disciplined appellant for same offense does not prove discrimination caused the current discipline when appellant testified he took no issue with the previous discipline.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9 (5/3/06).

·      Neither a single order of training intended to correct an observed performance deficiency nor criticisms in a logbook are adverse actions as necessary to prove discrimination.  In re Johnson, CSA 135-05, 4 (3/10/06).

·      Recent favorable action, including favorable reviews and compliments by the same supervisor, raises a strong presumption that no discrimination occurred, as the supervisor would not abruptly develop antipathy toward appellant because of her sex.  In re Johnson, CSA 135-05, 5 (3/10/06), citing Vallabhapurapu v. First National Bank, 998 F. Supp.906; Lowe v J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-175 (7^th Cir. 1992).

·      Misconduct is not comparable for purposes of proving disparate discipline where appellant recreation supervisor lost his composure at a game, faced off with referee, and refused to leave after being ejected from building, when compared to an incident where another recreation supervisor merely responded to a referee’s call by saying, “that’s bullsh-” without finishing the word, drawing a technical foul.  In re Trujillo, CSA 44-05, 5-6 (11/14/05). 

·      Appellant failed to establish disparate discipline by producing no evidence about the other employees’ protected status, the nature of their violations, and whether or how they were disciplined for those violations.  In re Garcia, CSA 175-04, 7 (7/12/05).

·      Where appellant presented no evidence that she is a member of a protected group, she failed to meet her burden of proof on her discrimination claim. In re Roberts, CSA 179-04, 5-6 (6/29/05).

·      Layoff that followed 2004 rules governing demotional appointments did not discriminate against African American employee even though 2003 layoff rules would have treated her more favorably. In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).

·      Agency’s failure to make an exception to its rules on layoff units and seniority is not proof of intent to discriminate.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).   

·      Layoff that had no disproportionate effect on members of appellant’s race did not have a disparate impact on the basis of race.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).

·      Chart of discipline imposed on employees by race did not compare similarly situated employees, and did not prove disparity in discipline based on race.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 10 (3/31/05).  

·      Evidence that appellant believed she was treated differently but did not know why failed to establish membership in a protected group, the first element of a prima facie case of discrimination.  In re Leal-McIntyre, CSA 77-03, 134-03 and 167-03, 4 (1/27/05); citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

·      When evidence reveals no grounds to support inference of age or political affiliation discrimination, directed verdict is properly granted as to both claims.  In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 8-9 (1/5/05).

Age

·      To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, appellant must show membership in a protected age group, more than 40 years old, an adverse employment action, and that similarly situated employee was treated differently.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 9-10 (5/3/06).

·      Age discrimination case fails where appellant did not show that a younger person was disciplined less severely or at all for the same conduct, or that his supervisor was aware of his age.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 10 (5/3/06).

·      Age discrimination is dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case where appellant failed to present evidence of his age, that his supervisor was aware of his age, or that the suspension was imposed because of his age.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 10 (3/31/05), citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Group, 517 U.S. 368 (1996).

Disability

·      Appellant failed to prove she was disabled because there was no evidence as to how her insomnia and breathing difficulties affected a major life activity, what record of impairment she suffers, or how the agency regarded her as being disabled.  In re Vigil, CSA 110-05, 7 (3/3/06).

·      Under the ADA, a person may prove a disability in three ways: 1) the actual existence of a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, 2) a record of such impairment, or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 4 (4/29/05), citing 42 USC § 12102(2) (A); and 29 CFR § 1630.2(g) (1994 ed. and Supp. V).

·      A disability is a physical or psychological impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activity.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 4 (4/29/05), citing 42 USC § 12102(2) (A).

·      Each phrase in the definition of disability is interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled based upon the legislative findings and purposes that motivate the ADA. In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 4 (4/29/05), citing Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).

·      Major life activities are those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 4 (4/29/05), citing 29 CFR pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i).

·      Performing manual tasks is a major life activity.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 4 (4/29/05), citing 29 CFR § 1630.2 (i).

·      A person is substantially limited in a major life activity if she is unable to perform or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which she can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the average person's ability to perform that activity.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04. 5 (4/29/05), citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.4(a) (1).

·      To be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have a permanent or long-term impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives.  The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long-term.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 

·      The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity is based upon the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual, and as such must be  made on a case-by-case basis.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).  

·      In determining the effect of an impairment on an employee’s life, the fact-finder must consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its permanent, long-term, or expected impact.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(j).

·      An individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment is one whose symptoms vary widely from person to person, such as carpal tunnel syndrome.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).

·      A temporary condition or a condition of indefinite duration may also be a disability if it is severe in nature.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.4(d).

·      Temporary carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms of numbness and tingling in the hands indicate that condition was mild in nature.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05).

·      A temporary inability to meet typing and filing deadlines does not establish that numbness and tingling in hands substantially limited employee’s ability to perform manual tasks.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 5 (4/29/05), citing Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54 (1^st Cir. 2001); Ouzts v. USAIR, 24 ADD 704 (D. Pa. 1996); and Wilmarth v. City of Santa Rosa, 945 F.Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

·      The ADA also protects a person who has a history of a disability or who has been classified or misclassified as having a disability.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05), citing 42 USC § 12102(2) (B); 29 CFR § 1630.2(k).

·      Doctor's notes showing a diagnosis of non-disabling carpal tunnel syndrome is not a record of a disability.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05). 

·      A record of a condition that is not a disability is insufficient to support a claim that employee has a history of disability under the ADA.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05), citing Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635 (2^nd Cir. 1998).

·      A person who is perceived as disabled is also protected from discrimination based on Congress’ recognition that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05), citing 42 USC § 12102(2)(C); and School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

·      The focus of a discrimination claim against an employee regarded as disabled is on the employer's state of mind, such as concerns about productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of accommodation and accessibility, and acceptance by co-workers and customers.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05), citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.8; House Judiciary Report at 30.

·      Appellant may prove disability discrimination by presenting evidence that 1) the agency perceives her as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and 2) the agency made an employment decision because of the perception of disability.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 6 (4/29/05), citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(l) (1); 29 CFR pt. 1630, pt. 1630.2(1).

·      Where appellant’s work restrictions based on carpal tunnel syndrome were removed several months before the performance evaluation, and supervisor had forgotten about them, appellant failed to prove the agency perceived her as disabled.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 7 (4/29/05).  

·      An employer’s knowledge and accommodation of work restrictions is insufficient evidence that an employee was regarded as disabled.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 7 (4/29/05), citing Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6^th Cir. 2000); Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879 (7^th Cir. 1999). 

·      Evidence of performance problems alone does not support a finding that appellant was perceived as disabled. In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 7 (4/29/05).

·      An employer's knowledge and accommodation of work restrictions is insufficient evidence that an employee was regarded as disabled.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04 (4/29/05), citing Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6^th Cir. 2000); and Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879 (7^th Cir. 1999).

·      Appellant’s failure to prove she was disabled defeated her harassment and retaliation claims because appellant did not prove she was a member of a legally protected class.  In re Solano, CSA 107-04, 7 (4/29/05).

·      Evidence that drowsiness is a side-effect of appellant’s medication does not demonstrate a physical limitation substantially limiting a major life function in the absence of evidence as to the nature of the impairments, and effect on appellant’s life and ability to do the essential functions of his job.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 10-11 (3/31/05), citing 29 CFR 1614.203(a) (1); and Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 168 F.3d 1228 (10^th Cir. 1999); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).   

·      It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05), citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), citing 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(j) (2) (ii-iii).

·      Without proof of a disability, the necessity to reasonably accommodate does not arise under the ADA.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05).

·      Appellant’s claim that the agency should have waived its rule against sleeping on duty as a reasonable accommodation of his need to take a medicine that can cause drowsiness is not well founded.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05).

·      The law prohibiting discrimination based upon a record of a substantially limiting impairment is intended to prevent discrimination because of a history of disability or a misclassification as disabled.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05), citing ADA Handbook, EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 43; 29 CFR § 1630.2(k.).

·      Discrimination against those who are regarded as disabled by their employer is Congress’ acknowledgement that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05); citing School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).

·      Appellant failed to prove he was considered or misclassified as disabled based on testimony that he had given former supervisor medical documents regarding his heart stint, since documents were not in appellant’s file, and current supervisor knew only that he had a heart stint.  In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 11 (3/31/05).

Disparate impact

·      Disparate impact discrimination is proven if employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05), citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977).

·      In disparate impact discrimination, it is necessary to show that the employees whose treatment is being compared are similarly situated in all relevant respects.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 7 (6/13/05), citing Ward v. Proctor & Gamble Products Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8^th Cir. 1997).                    
 

        Political affiliation

·      To establish a prima facie case of political affiliation discrimination, appellant must establish that (1) political affiliation and/or beliefs were substantial or motivating factors behind the adverse agency action, and (2) his position did not require political allegiance.  In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 9 (1/5/05), citing Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2000).

·      There appears to be a valid first amendment argument that lack political affiliation should be included in the concept of political affiliation discrimination.  In re Hurdelbrink, CSA 109-04, 119-04, 9 (1/5/05), citing Whitfield v. Pennsylvania Gas Works, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18550 (D. Pa., 1997).

Pregnancy

·      Appellant establishes a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination if she establishes: 1) she was a member of a protected group; 2) she was qualified for the modified-duty position sought; 3) she was denied the position; and 4) the denial occurred under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  In re Allen, CSA 16-06, 3 (6/6/06), citing EEOC v Horizon Healthcare Corp., 220 F. 3d 1184 (10^th Cir. 2000). 

Race

·      Coworker’s testimony that he believed race may have played a role in hastening his departure from the agency, and appellant’s conclusory statements in her prehearing and closing statements are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.  In re Diaz, CSA 45-05, 9 (9/7/05).

·      Appellant failed to prove that demotion in lieu of layoff to a specific division was motivated by discriminatory intent when the other divisions were outside the layoff unit and appellant offered no proof that agency knew demotion would deny her future promotional opportunities.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 5-6 (6/13/05).

·      In the absence of evidence that employees of a different race were treated more favorably than African American employees, appellant has failed to present evidence that the actions taken against her were motivated by discriminatory intent.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 6 (6/13/05).

·      Appellant fails to establish disparate treatment on the basis of race when the more-favored employee is the same race as appellant.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 8 (6/13/05).

·      In the absence of evidence that the lay-off which followed race-neutral rules had a disproportionate effect on members of her race, appellant failed to establish a prime facie case of adverse impact discrimination.  In re Jackson, CSA 103-04, 7 (6/13/05).

·      Discipline given to other employees for different violations does not establish disparity in treatment based on race or color. In re Owens, CSA 139-04, 10 (3/31/05).

Harassment

In general

·      To establish harassment, appellant must show under the totality of the circumstances that 1) the harassment was pervasive or severe enough to alter the terms, conditions or privileges of employment, and 2) the harassment was based on a protected status or stemmed from animus against a protected status.  In re Hernandez, CSA 03-06, 10 (5/3/06).

·      Harassment complaint must be filed first with supervisor, appointing authority or human resources department before perfecting appeal.  In re Vigil, CSA 110-05, 7-8 (3/3/06).

·      Harassment is actionable only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.  In re Williams, CSA 65-05, 8 (11/17/05), citing Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

·      To establish a prima facie case of harassment, appellant must show under the totality of the circumstances 1) the harassment was pervasive or severe enough to alter the terms, conditions or privilege of employment, and 2) the harassment was racial or stemmed from racial animus.   In re Garcia, CSA 175-04, 7 (7/12/05).

·      A showing of pervasiveness requires more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity.  In re Garcia, CSA 175-04, 7 (7/12/05).

·      Appellant must produce evidence to show the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.  In re Garcia, CSA 175-04, 7 (7/12/05).